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ABSTRACT 
Disasters are highly inopportune and represent a convergence of complexities, including 
multiple layers of government, private and non-profit organizations, and diverse 
populations. The complexity and unpredictability of disasters has been countered with 
structured management strategies. While an ordered environment has merit, perhaps the 
management of disasters is over-engineered that results in missed opportunities to 
capitalize on collaborative, decentralized solutions. This thesis evaluates the processes 
and procedures for responding to disasters by examining the current tiered response 
model (local, state, federal) and exploring whether a nonlinear, adaptive approach could 
improve interagency collaboration and result in better resource utilization.  
This research creates a framework for dialogue about the deeper appreciation of 
the complexities and hardships of disaster response. The management of disasters has 
been routinely criticized. Using a formative program evaluation method, primary and 
secondary data analysis focuses on understanding the roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders, the effectiveness of resource deployment, and intergovernmental 
collaboration during disaster response.  
This thesis concludes with several recommendations ranked based on multiple 
factors including political acceptability, economic plausibility, public perception, 
effectiveness, and appropriate utilization of resources.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The complexity and unpredictability of disasters has been countered with 
structured management strategies. While an ordered environment has merit, perhaps the 
management of disasters is over-engineered resulting in missed opportunities to capitalize 
on collaborative, decentralized solutions. As Hurricane Sandy ripped through the east 
coast in October 2012, President Obama’s message was “no red tape, cut through the 
bureaucracy.”1 After decades of responding to disasters and ample opportunity to refine, 
even perfect processes, it begs asking why red tape and bureaucracy continues to pervade 
disaster response and how the system can be improved. 
Disasters, ranging from minor to catastrophic, have occurred consistently 
throughout history and the frequency of these events is increasing. A noticeable trend in 
the rise of natural disasters has occurred, particularly concerning hydrometerological 
events, which have approximately doubled in occurrence over the past 20 years.2 
Furthermore, the effects of disaster are far-reaching. In a 15-year period from 1991–2005, 
natural disasters have affected 3,470 million people, lead to 960,000 deaths, and 
contributed to $1,193 billion dollars in economic loses.3 The increasing prevalence and 
impact of major disasters, paired with the economic implications, is justification for an 
adaptive and collaborative response system that efficiently utilizes resources and 
strategically manages response and recovery operations. The strategies utilized to manage 
disasters have incorporated themes of collaboration, such as welcoming the integration of 
nonprofit organizations and community members, but disparities exist in the consistency 
of application, utility, and effectiveness.  
                                                 
1 Kathleen Hennessey, “Obama Vows ‘No Red Tape’ Will Tour Storm Damage in New Jersey,” Los 
Angeles Times, 1, October 30, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-nn-obama-christie-sandy-
20121030,0,7118214.story.  
2 Reid Basher, “Disaster Impacts: Implications and Policy Responses,” Social Research 75, no. 3 (Fall 
2008): 939.  
3 Ibid., 940. 
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The manner in which the United States (U.S.) responds to disasters is routinely 
criticized. Each major U.S. disaster brings another tale of Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) corruption and failure, and yet another Congressional 
investigation into the problems in FEMA.4 Dating back to 1989 and 1992, catastrophic 
disasters, such as Hurricane Hugo, the Loma Prieta earthquake, and Hurricanes Andrew 
and Iniki, generated intense criticism of the federal response effort.5 In 2006, despite 
recognition of the catastrophic effects caused by Hurricane Katrina, FEMA again 
received widespread criticism for a slow and ineffective response.6 Town meetings, 
conferences, and congressional subcommittees convened to hear testimony and stories 
about Hurricane Katrina, and the condemnations of the slow response of local, state, and 
national relief efforts.7 The analyses and development of recommendations following 
these disasters focuses on common themes, such as collaboration, roles and 
responsibilities, command and control, and the appropriate utilization of resources. These 
issues collectively emerge as the Achilles heel of disaster response. Understanding the 
system as a whole, ways to leverage partnerships, and opportunities for optimizing scarce 
resources, are the foundation to improving disaster response effectiveness. 
The traditional response model is tiered (local, state, federal) and each tier builds 
upon the preceding. While this tiered approach outlines a progression of added 
governmental support as the magnitude of the disaster increases, instances arise when 
local and federal agencies need to partner directly with one another, and still other 
occasions occur when a disaster quickly reaches catastrophic proportions that requires 
federal assistance be mobilized quite rapidly. Nonlinear techniques and adaptations to the 
                                                 
4 Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson, “Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public 
Choice Analysis,” Public Choice 127 (2006): 55. 
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Disaster Management, Improving the Nation’s Response to 
Catastrophic Disasters, (GAO/RCED-93-186), 1, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149631.pdf.  
6 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s 
Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 1, 4, March 2006, 
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/mgmt/oig_06-32_mar06.pdf. 
7 Alan H. Stein and Gene B. Preuss, “Oral History, Folklore, and Katrina,” in There Is No Such Thing 
As a Natural Disaster, ed. Chester Hartman and Gregory D. Squires (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 37. 
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disaster response model enhance collaboration and allow for flexible management 
strategies. Such adaptations may consist of local-federal relationships by using available 
resources absent of presidential declarations, or involving federal agencies early in an 
effort to reduce the catastrophic effects of disasters.  
The national disaster response model has undergone continuous strategic and 
organizational change that range from a bureaucratic and command-oriented model to 
one that focuses on serving as a supportive element to local first responders.8 Historical 
evidence demonstrates both best practices and challenges associated with these 
techniques. Research shows that these different approaches, a lead versus supporting role, 
have succeeded in different circumstances. This thesis explores what contributes to the 
successes of these opposite approaches and proposes a shift to a nonlinear model for 
disaster response better suited to adapt to the complexity and diversity of disasters of 
varying type and degree.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Can an adaptive, nonlinear response model, rather than the traditional tiered 
response model, improve the effectiveness of intergovernmental collaboration? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 Does consistent understanding of roles and responsibilities occur? 
 What contributing factors lead to effective or ineffective disaster 
response? 
 What aspects of the current tiered model should be either sustained or 
restructured? 
C. METHODS 
This thesis used formative program evaluation, consisting of primary and 
secondary data collection, to address the research questions. The research begins with 
                                                 
8 William L. Waugh Jr. and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management,” Public Administration Review (2006): 131, 135. 
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secondary data analysis. The secondary data collection consists of academic research, 
plans, and after-action reports focusing on collaboration and leadership, government 
response to major and catastrophic disasters, predicting effectiveness, and the design and 
sustainment of response networks. The data analysis for this thesis focuses on the 
following. 
 Roles and responsibilities of government agencies that focuses on federal 
and local agencies in particular 
 Roles and responsibilities of those in leadership positions 
 Similarities and differences among disaster response operations 
 Interaction between governmental organizations 
 Successes and failures from responses 
 Techniques that proved to be most beneficial to the affected 
community 
 Noticeable differences between responses with greater cohesion 
and collaboration between federal and local entities 
1. Previous Programmatic and Policy Changes 
This research focuses on the core theme of linear versus nonlinear response 
models. The linear model is the current tiered system. The model is described as linear 
because of its sequential progression. Nonlinear approaches allow for adaptation and 
deviation from the standard model and do not necessarily build sequentially or in a 
straight line. Many factors contribute to the success of these two approaches. The review 
of secondary data collection explores factors that directly or tangentially relate to disaster 
response, such as the role of community-based organizations, the relationship between 
politics and disasters, and command and control.  
Primary data was gathered in a two-fold manner. The first phase of the data 
collection consisted of qualitative interviews conducted with subject matter experts in the 
field of emergency management. This collection consists of 15 qualitative questions that 
focus on a range of topics, including collaboration, intergovernmental cooperation, roles 
and responsibilities, inclusion of community-based organizations, the process of 
gathering information about affected jurisdictions, opportunities for improvement, and 
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best practices. The qualitative interviews specifically focus on emergency management 
professionals from larger metropolitan areas, FEMA regional offices, and FEMA 
headquarters. This research does not intend to draw comparisons between urban and rural 
environments. The focus on metropolitan areas is due to the likelihood that large cities 
generally have more resources available for response and recovery that would welcome a 
more adaptive, nonlinear approach. Future research in this topic could explore the merits 
of a nonlinear system in rural communities.  
The second portion of the primary data collection is participant observation. 
Participant observation consists of experiences in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in response 
to Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee in August and September 2011, and Hurricane 
Sandy in October 2012. These examples illustrate some of the challenges that accompany 
disasters in large cities. This form of research is designed to provide qualitative evidence, 
but represents just one jurisdiction and is not indicative or telling of other disasters.  
This research experienced limitations. Future research in this area should expand 
the primary data collection and seek to diversify the types of participants. One evident 
omission is the lack of incorporation of state agencies. In the current tiered model, states 
are a central conduit between federal and local entities. Further research on this topic 
should incorporate participants across the spectrum of governmental agencies, which 
should also include participants from various sized communities, and not just major 
metropolitan areas. Additionally, as private sector and nongovernmental organizations 
play a greater role in disaster response, future research should be inclusive of these “non-
traditional” response entities to justify the value of a structured system or support the 
transition to a more dynamic model. Finally, this research could be strengthened by 
incorporating examples or models from other fields. Research that draws parallels from 
other disciplines provides valuable perspective. For example, private corporations or 
other governmental organizations that have embraced a systems model to improve 
collaborative partnerships can highlight the specific benefits and challenges of various 
organizational structures.  
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis has several purposes. First, as illustrated earlier, the ways in which the 
United States and various governmental organizations collectively respond to disasters 
has been routinely criticized. Sometimes this criticism is warranted and constructive. 
Constructive critique can help organizations improve their operations and better fulfill 
their respective missions. In fact, constructive criticism, through the development of after 
action reviews, has become a routine practice in emergency management. The second 
purpose of this thesis is to reframe the understanding of disasters. However, more than 
simply reframing and describing, this research creates a framework for serious dialogue 
about the deeper appreciation of the complexities and hardships of disaster response. This 
thesis does not address all elements of disaster management concepts, but readers should 
understand core themes, players, roles and responsibilities, and ways in which 
organizations can effectively collaborate. The final objective focuses on the benefits and 
challenges of linear and nonlinear disaster response models, and explores whether an 
adaptive, systems approach to disasters has merit.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides background information about the disaster 
response system and identifies the various themes that relate to or influence response 
including citizen involvement, contributions made by voluntary organizations, and the 
role of politics. Chapter III, Systems Thinking, explores disaster response as a system for 
managing complex events and explores the merits and limitations of an adaptive 
approach. Chapter IV, Analysis, summarizes the primary data collection component of 
this research and identifies core themes and similarities and differences between local, 
regional, and federal (headquarters’) beliefs about disaster response, and provides a series 
of recommendations developed from qualitative data collection and supported by 
secondary data. The recommendations are then nominally scored based on five categories 





thesis concludes with ideas for future research opportunities. These ideas were gathered 
from primary and secondary data collection and range from a recommitment to current 
concepts to new and potentially transformative approaches.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review serves as a primer for understanding disaster response and 
the numerous factors in play during emergencies. This list of influential factors is not 
exhaustive, but focuses on reoccurring themes in literature. Such factors include but are 
not limited to collaboration, role of community-based and nonprofit organizations, and 
the role of politics in both the disaster declaration and response processes. Additionally, 
this literature review identifies areas of consensus and debate, theories relating to 
emergency management, and limitations in the literature.  
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF DISASTER RESPONSE 
Emergency management has existed since the Civil Defense era. Given that this 
thesis explores current emergency management concepts, the history as described in this 
thesis begins with the creation of FEMA as the federal coordinating agency for 
emergency management. FEMA was created by Executive Order in 1979. Similarly to 
the later creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, FEMA’s creation meant a consolidation and alignment of related 
functions within a central agency. It is important to note that the creation of FEMA was 
not in response to one particular incident, but rather to a growing frequency of major 
disasters and systemic challenges surrounding government coordination. Throughout 
history, numerous federal agencies were tasked with pieces of disaster response and the 
provision of assistance. Although attempts were made to define and expand the federal 
government’s role in emergency management, perpetual issues occurred with 
coordination stemming from the absence of a single federal entity responsible for 
coordinating disaster response.9 
                                                 
9 Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, “The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Publication 1,” 6, November 2010, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/pub1.pdf.  
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Even following the formal creation of a single coordinating entity, specific 
disasters have challenged FEMA and have required the rethinking and rescoping of 
missions and objectives. Specifically, terrorism incidents and international emergencies 
pose fundamental questions about FEMA’s role in managing these types of emergencies. 
U.S. history has definitely experienced its fair share of disasters. Examples of some of 
FEMA’s more historic responses include Love Canal in 1980, the Cuban Refugee Crisis 
in 1980, the Cerro Grande fire between 2000 and 2004, Hurricane Andrews in 1992, the 
Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster in 1993, Bam, the Iran Earthquake in 2003, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010.10 Additionally, FEMA was 
involved in the response to the bombing at the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 2003 
(commonly known as the Oklahoma City Bombing) and the response to the World Trade 
Center, Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. In addition to 
the infamous catastrophic disasters, FEMA is involved regularly in local incidents by 
providing emergency support and financial assistance.  
Profound diversity exists in the type of incidents in which FEMA engages. In 
some regards, the diversity in type and magnitude of incidents is creating an environment 
bound for failure. Emergency management has become a landing pad for complex 
problems that has led to a departure of focus on core mission capabilities. In addition to 
the increasing variety and expansion of operating space, numerous factors influence 
disaster response, both good and bad. Naim Kapucu’s research, “Planning for Disasters 
and Responding to Catastrophes: Error of the Third Type in Disaster Policy and 
Planning,” petitions for networked environments to support the complexity of disaster 
response. Kapucu argues that the public has high expectations about the processes for 
managing disasters that can only be met by bottom-up community capacity building. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, “The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Publication 1,” 13–14. 
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The response to catastrophic disasters provides clear evidence of the 
different standards expected of the public sector in the 21st century—no 
matter whether those standards were actually achieved in that event or not. 
Just as Hurricane Andrew closed a chapter and the century in the history 
of catastrophic events in the US with the public’s demand for radically 
better public sector performance, the 9/11 disaster inaugurates 
expectations of new, substantially higher standards while simultaneously 
exemplifying the incredible complexity of successfully managing the 
panoply of catastrophic disasters in the future.11 
The response to major disasters has been largely reactive. Disasters have provided 
the impetus for the creation of new agencies, new frameworks, and policy changes. While 
these changes are seen as challenging, perhaps even disorganized, the willingness to be 
adaptive is promising and demonstrates the pursuit of program efficiency and 
effectiveness. It also demonstrates that change can also result from public demands and 
lobbying. Kapucu’s writing demonstrates that despite previous failures, the public 
expects more and more in the aftermath of disasters. The status quo is not tolerated.  
This formative approach is exemplified by the recent changes in national disaster 
response doctrine. Throughout FEMA’s history, the organization has developed lengthy 
and verbose response guidance documents that provide a roadmap for coordination. What 
started as the Federal Response Plan (FRP), later transitioned to the National Response 
Plan (NRP). This represented a shift away from a federally heavy response to a system 
inclusive of agencies and organizations from across the nation, including other 
governments. Response doctrine changed again and became the National Response 
Framework (NRF). The NRF focuses on process and structure, but allows for flexibility 
within Emergency Support Functions (ESF). It is worth noting that the concept of ESF 
was part of the NRP as well. While seemingly insignificant, this shift to the NRF is 
symbolic in that it acknowledges that one single plan may very well be woefully 
inadequate and the guidance provided in the NRF fosters and encourages just-in-time 
planning and strategizing. The final and most recent evolution in response doctrine 
resulted in the development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), 
                                                 
11 Naim Kapucu, “Planning for Disasters and Responding to Catastrophes: Error of the Third Type in 
Disaster Policy and Planning,” International Journal of Public Policy 3, nos. 5/6 (2008): 314. 
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which is an even greater metamorphosis of FEMA’s perception of its role in disaster 
response, which recognizes and emphasizes the role of state and local government in 
disaster response and FEMA’s role in and focus on disaster recovery. FEMA’s newest 
slogan “not the team, but part of the team,” is exhibited in the policy shifts that have 
occurred during the past several years.12  
C. CATEGORIZATION OF LITERATURE 
Numerous sub-topics in which to categorize literature about the national disaster 
response model exist. For the purposes of this thesis, important categories include 
organizational structure and leadership, the role of community-based organizations, and 
the role of politics in disaster relief operations. While this thesis focuses primarily on 
disaster response operations, extensive research and opportunity to explore how well 
various models works for prevention and preparation and long-term recovery exists as 
well. While all disasters provide opportunity for evaluation of practice, more historic 
disasters—generally those that have been more costly, have led to greater loss of life, and 
received significant media attention—have elicited transformative cultural shift. 
Hurricane Katrina was one of these defining events and the research pertaining to the 
challenges in the Gulf Coast is extensive.  
1. Organizational Structure and Leadership 
The field and profession of emergency management have been evolving into a 
more collaborative enterprise since the 1940s and 1950s.13 The organizational structure 
of FEMA is indicative of a shift towards a collaborative venture. Like many federal 
agencies, FEMA is organized around geographic regions and embodies a hybrid model 
consisting of centralized headquarters and operational regional offices. Concerted efforts 
have been made to decentralize FEMA operations further by empowering regional 
offices. FEMA Administrator, Craig Fugate, strongly believes that emergency 
                                                 
12 Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, “About the Agency,” (n.d.), 
http://www.fema.gov/about.  
13 Waugh and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 131. 
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management organizations are most responsive and effective when the unambiguous 
authority to make necessary operational decisions is delegated to the lowest command 
levels possible and he has delegated several authorities to regional offices so they are 
better equipped to work with state and local governments.14 This division and 
decentralized structure provides a platform for collaboration with state and local entities. 
The shift away from a top-down bureaucratic model to a more dynamic and flexible 
system facilitates multiorganizational, intergovernmental, and intersectoral cooperation.15 
Specifically with disaster planning, a geographic-based approach enables agencies to 
focus on pertinent and realistic scenarios, rather than preparing for generalized and 
unspecific threats.  
However, during disasters, FEMA is often forced into discarding the 
decentralized model to ensure that a sufficient number of disaster reservists are available 
to support the response. The result is an onslaught of personnel unfamiliar with the 
landscape. When Hurricane Irene arrived in Philadelphia in the fall of 2011, disaster 
reservists responded who knew very little about the Philadelphia community and were 
unfamiliar with local responders, elected officials, and the characteristics of the 
community and landscape.16 The steep learning curve that accompanies this approach 
creates a disjointed response that may not best support the involved communities. 
However, research will later suggest that external responders—those not living in the 
disaster area—add value because they can focus on their assigned missions and are less 
preoccupied by simultaneously worrying about their families and loved ones. As 
described by one participant during the interview portion of the data collection, the 
deployment of disaster reservists and Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) from other 
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regions may be the business model FEMA chooses to use as a means of eliminating the 
complications that arise from personalities and good or bad long-standing relationships.17  
Organizational structure is not a benign issue and can actually impact the utility of 
disaster response. Historically, disaster response operations have often been quite 
centralized and provide little room for creativity. The top-down, centralized response to 
Hurricane Katrina afforded little room for flexibility and did not accommodate the 
complexities of the disaster. The assumption that one agency could manage a disaster of 
that magnitude was unrealistic.18 Evidence suggests systemic challenges with 
organizational structure and design in several nationally significant responses. For 
example, in 2009 DHS, Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed FEMA’s response to 
Hurricane Ike. While that assessment was largely favorable, at times, FEMA departed 
from doctrinal guidance within the NRF; a structure that focuses on engaged 
partnerships, tiered response, adaptability, unified command, and readiness to act.19 As 
cited by OIG, a need exists to clarify the authority of local and regional emergency 
managers to make operational decisions.20 Doing so will ensure that resources provided 
match unmet needs and streamline response operations. While criticized by OIG, the 
departure from the NRF should not necessarily been viewed as problematic. Response 
plans can rarely be executed as expected and often require flexible approaches and 
improvisation to deal with an uncertain and changing environment.21  
Weaknesses in the newly formed DHS became apparent during the interagency 
fiascoes of Hurricane Katrina that impacted nearly one and a half million people in 
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Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.22 The failures of local, state, and federal agencies’ 
capacities to collaborate revealed acute weaknesses in preparation, alarming failures in 
translating preparation into action, and the inability to improvise in the face of life-
threatening events.23 The mismanaged response to Hurricane Katrina, an effort plagued 
by slow response and inefficient use of resources, provides opportunity to explore 
disaster response strategies to find efficiencies and opportunities.  
2. Role of Community-Based Organizations 
Research also finds challenges with a centralized disaster response approach 
because it can be less inclusive and not capitalize on the availability of resources coming 
from private industry and community-based organizations (CBO). Locally based 
recovery efforts have added benefits because they engage the local community and 
provide job opportunities.24 In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the utilization of resources 
readily available through major private corporations was significantly limited by the need 
for processes to be channeled through FEMA. In addition to response operations being 
enhanced by a collaborative, decentralized system, recovery efforts that evolve based on 
action on the ground produce faster, more robust, and more sustainable redevelopment 
than efforts stemming from politically produced and centrally executed plans.25 
FEMA’s current focus on whole community is a method for capitalizing of 
community self-organizing. This decentralized approach to disaster management 
acknowledges the limitations of governments, recognizes the strength in community-
based concepts, and empowers communities to assume responsibility during disasters. 
FEMA’s approach is not novel. Following Hurricane Katrina, noble community 
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organizing efforts were undertaken by groups, such as the Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), People Improving Communities through 
Organizing (PICO), and the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), to support the 
reconstruction of Crescent City.26  
Several disciplines are thinking about ways to best capitalize on the infrastructure 
that exists within communities. The “whole of society” concept outlined by Stavridis and 
Farkas in “The 21st Century Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration” calls for a 
shift away from the “whole of government” approach to a more inclusive strategy that 
recognizes government limitations and makes better use of limited public and private 
resources.27 Social connections play an integral role in community resiliency. Political 
scientist Daniel Aldrich lobbies for people to become more involved in their communities 
as a disaster preparedness measure and has demonstrated that following Hurricane 
Katrina, the Japanese earthquake, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia, the strongest 
communities fared better.28 In the 11 years since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 
the public has shown an interest in being involved and will self-organize to solve 
problems.  
3. Citizen Response 
Many lay persons, and unfortunately some emergency managers, appear to 
believe that people respond to disasters in socially disorganized and even personally 
disoriented manners.29 A misconception exists that social breakdown, not community 
resilience, ensues following a disaster. This misconception may have led to the desire for 
a command and control model to counter the sporadic and unpredictable behavior of the 
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public. Conversely, researchers have found that in the immediate aftermath of disasters, 
community resilience and unity, strengthening of social ties, self-help, heightened 
initiative, altruism, and pro-social behavior more often prevail.30 Prolific examples of aid 
provided by citizens and the benefits of leveraging the citizen response abound. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, more than 14,000 volunteers throughout the nation were 
actively involved in response and recovery efforts; efforts that varied from actively 
assisting with the executive of emergency evacuation plans to welcoming and registering 
evacuees as they arrived at emergency shelter locations.31 
The assumptions about how the public will behave following a major natural 
disaster or act of terrorism is unfortunately not limited to the media’s role in shaping this 
belief. Policy makers and planners also appear to have expectations about human 
response not compatible with known behavior principles and with data on human 
behavior under emergency conditions.32 Three common myths are that citizens will 
panic, they are helpless and dependent, and looting and lawlessness occurs following 
disasters.33 While these behaviors occur on occasion, they are not the norm. Having a 
better understanding and appreciation for citizen reaction can improve the ways in which 
emergencies are responded to by allowing for the development of more accurate response 
strategies, including greater resource prioritization. Most citizens respond constructively 
to environmental threats by seeking information and obtaining resources to help them 
cope with an incident.34 This desire for information and seeking of supporting resources 
can serve as a force multiplier for the comprehensive manner in which communities 
respond to emergencies.  
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In 2004, The New York Academy of Medicine conducted research entitled, 
Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning through the Eyes of the Public. The study 
focuses on how the American public would respond to two scenarios, a dirty bomb and a 
smallpox outbreak. While the results on how the public would respond and their level of 
trust in directions provided by government officials differs, one largely unanimous 
conclusion was that the public is interested in community-level planning—not just in 
learning about plans, but being actively involved in the development of plans.35  
4. Political Culture 
The final recurring subcategory speaks to political culture. This culture is the 
broadest category in that it addresses the political and economic climate within a specific 
jurisdiction, but also the role of public corruption, the tendency of disaster declarations to 
be based on political affiliations and election cycles, and the challenges with 
intergovernmental collaboration. The “government failure” that plagued the response to 
Hurricane Katrina can be attributed to inertia, corruption, and waste visible at all levels of 
government.36 The City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana have deep-rooted 
public corruption problems and literature suggests that this corruption contributed to 
FEMA’s delay in response and over cautiousness, one of six problems later highlighted in 
the public choice theory.37 Public choice theory is used to explain politically driven 
decision making that result in outcomes usually in conflict with the preferences of the 
public.38  
While the extent to which politics impacts operations is varied throughout the 
literature, evidence supports the highly politicized nature of disasters. The assumption 
with Hurricane Katrina is that partisan politics had a significant impact on the operational 
decisions. Examples of the politicized nature of decisions seen during Hurricane Katrina 
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include the struggle over the federalization of the National Guard between Governor 
Blanco and President Bush, and the ability of Mississippi Governor Barbour to obtain a 
large amount of disaster aid despite having lesser damage and unmet needs.39 
The description of federal aid provided in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is 
quite unfavorable. Research suggests that the involvement of the federal government is 
“at best superfluous and at worst positively destructive.”40 The literature consistently 
claims that decisions about federal disaster aid were highly politicized and often not 
based on actual need, which was supported by evidence that the mean rate of disaster 
declarations is higher in election years compared to non-election years.41 While the desire 
to shift towards a decentralized, regional model focuses on improving response through 
collaborative networks, a nonlinear model that focuses solely on the needs of 
communities may subsequently reduce the tendency of disaster aid influenced by politics. 
Policies that assume the federal government plays the primary role in disaster response 
are the most susceptible to corruption.42 Therefore, a shift to a decentralized model with 
dispersed command and control, one that specifically focuses on local government, could 
aid in minimizing corruption. 
D. AREAS OF CONSENSUS AND DEBATE 
The balance between command and control and a more flexible approach to 
disaster response was mentioned in nearly all the selected literature. Research emphasizes 
the challenges with the centralized approach during Hurricane Katrina that revealed a 
national emergency management system in disarray, one incapable of responding 
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effectively to the immediate needs of the affected communities and one unprepared to 
coordinate the massive response and recovery effort.43  
Another area of debate is the value of community-based organizations in the 
response and recovery processes. While evidence supports the utilization of CBOs, 
literature also exists that speaks to the value gained by having strangers—those with no 
connection to the impacted community—responding to major disasters. Charles Fritz’s 
research in “Disasters Compared in Six American Communities” demonstrates that those 
who take on initial leadership roles are generally those with no emotional involvement in 
the disaster.44 The greater detachment enables these individuals to exercise control over 
their decisions.45 This theory is a departure from the notion that local-level leadership 
and coordination is essential. Other viewpoints encourage local engagement and 
emphasize the importance of local knowledge. Small variances and infinitesimal changes, 
in what appear to be insignificant variables, can have an enormous impact on disaster 
response.46 These variances may be unrecognizable by responders unfamiliar with the 
local landscape.  
E. THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS 
Public choice theory, based on the principle of self-interest, was commonly 
referenced throughout the literature. Sobel and Leeson outline six problems that 
demonstrate public choice theory at work during the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
These problem areas are characteristics that repeatedly surfaced throughout the literature. 
The six areas include layered bureaucracy in which too many individuals have control 
over resources, over-cautiousness in decision making, political manipulation of disaster 
declarations and relief aid, problems with acquiring timely and accurate information 
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about needs, glory-seeking by government officials, and shortsightedness resulting in 
biased decision making.47 While Sobel and Leeson refer specifically to Hurricane 
Katrina, instances of these factors have occurred in many disaster operations.  
“The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005–2015): Building the Resilience of 
Nations and Communities to Disasters” is another model for the development and 
sustainment of a collaborative disaster response system. While designed to address 
disaster risk reduction, the priorities for action can be applied to disaster response 
strategies and support the need for an interdisciplinary approach to disaster response. The 
Hyogo Framework focuses on actions that ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national 
and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation, ensure that 
disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for 
implementation, use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and 
resilience at all levels, reduce the underlying risk factors, and strengthen disaster 
preparedness for effective response at all levels.48 
Several key activities contribute to effective response.49  
1. Strengthen policy, technical and institutional capacities in regional, 
national and local disaster management, including those related to 
technology, training, and human and material resources. 
2. Promote and support dialogue, exchange of information and coordination 
among early warning, disaster risk reduction, disaster response, 
development, and other relevant agencies and institutions at all levels, 
with the aim of fostering a holistic approach towards disaster risk 
reduction. 
3. Strengthen, and when necessary, develop coordinated regional approaches, 
and create or upgrade regional policies, operational mechanisms, plans 
and communication systems to prepare for and ensure rapid and effective 
disaster response in situations that exceed national coping capacities. 
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4. Prepare or review and periodically update disaster preparedness and 
contingency plans and policies at all levels, with a particular focus on the 
most vulnerable areas and groups.  
5. Promote the establishment of emergency funds, where and as appropriate, 
to support response, recovery and preparedness measures. 
6. Develop specific mechanisms to engage the active participation and 
ownership of relevant stakeholders, including communities. 
F. GAPS IN LITERATURE 
Literature about this topic is heavily focused on the response to catastrophic 
disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While 
major disasters emphasize chronic challenges, a more comprehensive look at the national 
disaster response model is necessary. Literature that highlights response operations 
during more routine emergencies, not just catastrophic events, may better identify the 
functions of various responding entities and help build a response framework that could 
be applied in a variety instances. Case studies from more routine emergencies (e.g., large 
apartment fires, minor community flooding) can provide a framework for larger crisis 
response. Local disasters are test beds for community capacity building. Frameworks for 
responding to local disasters can be expanded upon when major or catastrophic disasters 
occur.  
Furthermore, the process for collecting and cataloging data about disasters is 
inconsistent. This inconsistency may be because disasters are not intrinsically well-
defined phenomena, and are interpreted and recorded in different ways by different 
actors. Another reason of particular importance is the improvement in the recording of 
events.50 As communication methods have become more readily available, extensive 
reporting occurs, which requires thoughtful and cautious analysis pertaining to causation 
and interpretation.51 In this case, these methods do not necessarily represent gaps in 
literature, but rather limitations in how research is interpreted and categorized.  
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III. SYSTEMS THINKING  
Disasters are inherently complex. They are a convergence of agencies, 
jurisdictions, laws, policies, and problems. Poul Anderson’s quote, “I have yet to see any 
problem, however complicated, which, when looked at in the right way did not become 
still more complicated,” is fitting in describing disasters and the impact on 
communities.52 Disasters are complicated problems only made more complex as the 
layers are peeled back and the intricacies are further discovered. The success of the 
response to any particular disaster can be attributed to the network in place to manage the 
complexity appropriately.  
A pair of social scientists coined the term “wicked problem” in 1973. Horst Ritel 
and Melvin Webber describe wicked problems as messy, ill-defined, more complex than 
originally thought, and open to multiple interpretations.53 Wickedness is not descriptive 
of the degree of difficulty, but rather the ease with which a problem can solved. A wicked 
problem has innumerable causes, is tough to describe, and generally does not have a 
singular correct answer.54 Issues, such as poverty, public education, and terrorism, are 
described as wicked. Disasters too are wicked problems. They are messy, ill-defined, and 
always more complex than they originally appear to be. No solution to a wicked problem 
is ever permanent or wholly satisfying to all stakeholders and is open to interpretation.55  
A. SYSTEMS APPROACH TO DISASTER RESPONSE 
Using a systems thinking approach can help frame the complexities of disasters 
and assist in the formulation of solutions. As stated by Donella Meadows in her book, 
Thinking in Systems, a system consists of elements, interconnections, and a function or 
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purpose.56 Applying these three components to disasters exemplifies the networked and 
inter-related nature of disaster response. The elements can be represented by the type of 
disaster, first responders, and involved communities. The interconnections consist of the 
various governmental agencies, non-profit organizations, and private sector players who 
may not only be affected by the disaster, but are responsible for managing the emergency. 
Finally, the function or purpose in the most basic sense is the response, recovery, and 
mitigation efforts. Functions could be represented by specific objectives, such as 
evacuating a community, providing shelter and housing, conducting damage assessment, 
debris management, reconstruction, or the function could be the operation in entirety. 
Despite criticism of the efficiency and efficacy of response to recent catastrophic 
disasters, disaster response is still analogous to a system—one that is flexible and 
adaptive to disasters that range in type, magnitude, and complexity.  
Well-functioning systems display resiliency, self-organizations, and have 
hierarchy, all working together harmoniously; ecosystems, human communities, or a 
community gearing up to respond to a storm all exhibit these components.57 Resilience is 
a measure of a system’s ability to survive and persist within a variable environment.58 
Systems thrive on feedback loops and the continual flow of information. A departure 
from a top-down response model to one that is decentralized could improve both the 
quality and speed of information exchange. A systemic challenge with command and 
control organizations is the lack of situational awareness and delays in action.59 
However, the flow of information requires appropriate balance. Larger organizations lose 
their resilience because the feedback mechanisms must travel through many layers, which 
can lead to a distortion of information.60 For example, when Hurricane Katrina occurred 
in 2005, individuals on the ground had the best knowledge, but were unable to implement 
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comprehensive rescue plans because information had to travel through the organization, 
be processed, strategy needed to be developed, and then finally, action could occur.61 
The second reason why systems work well is due to their ability to self-organize. 
Self-organizing is similar to evolution and adapting to one problem or a sequence of 
problems. Meadows uses the formation of snowflakes, an infant learning to speak, and a 
community organizing around a particular issue as examples of self-organization.62 The 
methods and processes used for managing disasters are self-organizing and adaptive to 
specific problems. Even local, state, and federal response plans account for self-
organizing as many of them outline a series of options, but cannot realistically provide an 
absolute solution. It is a mistake to assume that a response can be completely scripted or 
that the types of resources available can be fully catalogued.63  
The final component to successful systems is hierarchy, which might seem 
surprising or even contradictory because it is often assumed that networks and systems 
are generally more decentralized and open, even anti-hierarchical. However, a flexible 
hierarchy provides needed structure. Hierarchies are brilliant systems inventions, not only 
because they provide stability and resilience, but they reduce the amount of information 
any one component needs to manage.64 Disasters have shown the best and worst of 
hierarchies. Hierarchies have at times created tremendous delays and have led to overly 
bureaucratic processes. Nevertheless, the absence of hierarchy could lead to 
disproportionate and inequitable disaster response and confusion within the response 
system. Furthermore, shared responsibility and authority occur during disaster response. 
A flexible hierarchy can support a shared governance model and ensure that consistency 
and collaboration across agencies exists.  
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Emergency management capacity is built from the ground up. 
Neighborhood and community programs have to stand on their own 
because assistance may not arrive for hours or days. Major incidents are 
addressed by mutual assistance arrangements among community police, 
fire, and emergency medical service providers. Prevention is generally a 
local responsibility as well. Local governments have principal 
responsibility for adopting and enforcing building codes, building 
standards, and land-use regulations to mitigate water, wind, seismic, 
landslide, and other hazards. Local emergency managers are increasingly 
collaborating with building code, urban planning, and other officials who 
can help reduce risk. What we now call the new governance process forms 
the core of our national emergency response. Consensual processes are the 
rule.65 
B. IMPROVING DISASTER RESPONSE WITH SYSTEMS THINKING 
Planning with Complexity emphasizes the importance of capturing local 
knowledge, with particular focus on marginalized and vulnerable populations. During 
disasters, this  same subset of populations is disproportionately affected. Despite the 
challenges that plagued New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, profound success 
stories occurred concerning collaborative relationships that blend subject matter experts 
with community stakeholders. One-size-fits-all approaches do not as easily adapt to the 
needs of a community. The September 11th attacks and Hurricane Katrina are examples 
of the extent to which decision makers relied on inflexible, backward-looking approaches 
to problem solving in the midst of mercurial, life-threatening events of catastrophic 
proportions.66 The response to disasters consists of flooding an area with federal 
resources, sometimes regardless of the need or utility of such tools and supplies. In some 
regards, the success of the response to a particular disaster has been measured by how 
quickly an enormous amount of resources can be leveraged, but less about whether those 
are the right resources. For example, during both Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, National 
Guard resources were deployed to Philadelphia for what was described to local 
emergency management as a resource at their disposal. In both instances, the Guard could 
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not be mobilized without the approval of central command and the length of obtaining 
approval was the routine several hours,67 which is an example of what appears to be 
strategic forward deployment, but lacking the necessary policy to make this effective.  
A disaster response system that involves local communities, both as responders 
and as a source of information and intelligence, can direct and guide applicable and 
timely response efforts and be transformative for damaged communities. In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, the use of resources readily available through major private 
corporations was significantly limited by the need for processes to be channeled through 
FEMA. Confusion in the wake of Hurricane Katrina delayed the delivery of services, 
personnel, and other resources to people in need, which exacerbated losses of life, injury, 
and property damage that led people to view government response efforts as inept.68 
Cooperation is needed along traditionally vertical lines of government (local-state-
federal) and horizontal lines as well (neighboring and regional municipalities).69 
Successful hierarchies balance central control with control of subsystems; a balance 
between central control that drives coordination towards a central goal with autonomy to 
maintain subsystems, and keep them flourishing and functioning.70 
C. LIMITATIONS TO SYSTEMS THINKING 
An open system (one that interacts with the environment and continually 
exchanges information71) lacks central intelligence, and instead, is spread to the outer 
layers of the organization.72 In some ways, decentralized intelligence can be incredibly 
effective, particularly when intelligence leads to action. However, decentralized decision 
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making can lead to inconsistent action if each entity operates individually. In this regard, 
FEMA’s combination of central headquarters and operational regional offices is a good 
model for a hybrid systems organization.  
FEMA is comprised of 10 regional offices. Regional offices report to 
headquarters, but operate with some autonomy. The role of headquarters is important in 
providing framework, structure, and establishing procedure and policy. Headquarters also 
ensures continuity and congruity throughout the regions. Without consistent policy, 
disaster response programs would vary greatly. The autonomy in the application allows 
the regions to implement strategies most effective for local jurisdictions, but guidance 
from headquarters provides parallel action, which is particularly important for 
neighboring jurisdictions that reside in different FEMA regions. For example, FEMA 
Regions II (consisting of several states including New Jersey) and III (consisting of 
several states including Pennsylvania) were both affected by Hurricanes Irene and Sandy. 
If those regions responded to the disaster so differently, the state and local entities 
responding would have difficulty providing service, members of the public may be 
inclined to flee to the jurisdiction providing the most services, and public outcry could be 
significant, almost pinning jurisdictions against one another. The actions taken by 
government agencies need to be open and transparent and the public needs reassurance 
that decisions are being made equitably.  
Quick action and strategic use of limited resources are vital during disaster 
response. The second challenge facing governments seeking an open system is the 
tendency for collaborative processes to be time and resource intensive.73 The challenge 
facing nonlinear, decentralized disaster response networks is quickly executing while 
seeking consensus across numerous stakeholders. Particularly for an organization, such as 
FEMA that operates with both centralized and decentralized command, instances may 
occur when a departure of centralized policy is needed to foster a more organic and  
 
 
                                                 
73 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity (Routledge, January 14, 2010), 213. 
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precise responses. Instead of top-down procedures of planning the recovery, policy can 
foster an environment that encourages sustainable recovery clear in what it can provide 
and support the local society.74 
                                                 
74 Boettke et al., “The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina,” 371–372. 
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A. SURVEY DESIGN AND CONDUCT 
Qualitative data gathered from emergency management experts is used to evaluate 
further the current disaster response model, identify best practices and opportunities for 
improvement, and help shape the discussion regarding ways to establish 
intergovernmental collaboration. The process for collecting this data included a 15-
question qualitative survey conducted in person or by phone. Nine individuals 
participated in the survey; four participants were from local emergency management 
agencies, two from FEMA regional offices, and three from FEMA headquarters. 
Individuals were recruited based on the researcher’s professional contacts and cold-
calling participants based on current and previous position. Conversations lasted 
approximately one hour in duration. 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
For the purposes of the research, the national disaster response system is 
categorized as the multi-governmental response to presidentially declared disasters. The 
data collected focuses on six main categories. 
1. Intergovernmental collaboration 
2. Roles and responsibilities, including command and control 
3. Effectiveness of resource deployment 
4. Understanding local communities and the nuances of affected areas 
5. Transition from response to recovery, and specifically the transition of 
authority 
6. Best practices from disaster response  
Within these categories, data is further categorized by source: local perspective, regional 
perspective, and federal perspective. The local perspective is generated from emergency 
management leaders in major metropolitan communities. The regional perspective is 
developed based on comments from FEMA Regional Administrators (Regions III and V). 
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The federal perspective is based on feedback from FEMA leadership within FEMA 
headquarters in Washington, DC. 
1. Intergovernmental Collaboration 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions pertaining to 
intergovernmental collaboration. 
 Based on your professional experience, please describe the 
intergovernmental collaboration within the current disaster response 
structure. 
 If you identified that collaboration does not work as optimally as it 
should, what is this attributable to? Can you provide specific 
examples demonstrating this? 
 Does the current disaster response model align with FEMA’s Whole 
Community concept? Why or why not? 
 Does the current model provide opportunities for community based 





 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Pros 
- FEMA counterparts show up 
early and often. 
- Issues are resolved quickly, using 
a business-like model. 
- Respond well to customary 
disasters. 
- FEMA has done a good job 
developing useful programs and 
staffing those programs with 
highly skilled individuals. 
- FEMA is much more proactive 
and does not wait for declaration 
process to begin mobilization.  
- FEMA has focused on improving 
coordination and integration with 
private sector (Ex. Integration of 
Private Sector with National 
Response Coordination Center). 
- Empirical and qualitative data 
demonstrates a more adaptive and 
agile organization. 
- Intergovernmental collaboration 
works well. Challenges are more 
likely attributable to poor 
perception and understanding of 
disaster response structure. 
- Communication, cooperation, 
and collaboration are touchstone 
concepts for success. 
 
- Magnanimous efforts made by 
FEMA during Hurricane Katrina 
that were overshadowed by media 
coverage that failed to articulate the 
collaboration that was occurring. 
- There was a strong framework in 
place prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
but Katrina served as a wake-up call 
for all federal agencies and led to a 
thorough review of authorities and 
the ability to executive on those 
authorities.  
- Interagency process is working and 
continues to be refined.  
- FEMA’s emphasis on Whole 
Community shifts the paradigm 
towards inclusiveness. 
- FEMA has transitioned to being 
part of the team, not the leader of 
the team.  
- The collaborative approach allows 
organizations to prioritize issues 
and focus on outstanding needs and 
complex problems (Ex. integration 





 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Cons 
- Intergovernmental collaboration 
does not work as well as it should. 
Communication and coordination 
could be improved and FEMA 
should establish platforms for 
improved dialogue.  
- System continues to be 
challenged by novel disasters (Ex. 
H1N1, Fukushima disaster in 
Japan). There is not enough 
frequency of experience to 
adequately respond to novel and 
catastrophic disasters.  
- FEMA counterparts tend to rotate 
out of disaster areas frequently 
and turnover creates challenges 
with disaster continuity.  
- Disaster response is relationship-
based.  
- Challenges with coordination 
stem from the absence of 
mutually agreed upon priorities.  
- Need for improved capacity at 
the state and local level.  
- Examples in history demonstrate a 
management of disaster based on 
media that places the focus on the 
negatives of the situation and 
ignores the success stories.  




Concurrence among interview participants showed that intergovernmental 
collaboration is improving, and generally works well during disaster response, as well as 
unanimous support that collaboration is critical to managing disasters effectively. Local 
level participants referenced FEMA’s agility and focus on developing applicable 
programs and ensuring that programs are staffed with the correct number of individuals 
with the appropriate skill-sets. Participants identified several issues that continue to 
present challenges, which include the higher turnover rate in federal disaster employees 
(those deployed to a specific area), the complexity of managing novel or catastrophic 
disasters, the need to continue to expand on state and local capacity that will support the 
three-tiered response model, and the challenges in how an emergency is discussed by 
broadcast media—specifically, the tendency to neglect sharing the positive stories and 
focus solely on the negative accounts.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Greater Focus on Novel and Catastrophic Disasters. Events, 
such as the terrorist attacks of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, could foreshadow 
that more troubling and complex disasters are on the horizon; the worst is yet to come.75 
Research demonstrates that the collective management of routine disasters works well, 
but novel and catastrophic disasters continue to pose challenges. Recent examples of 
novel emergencies include H1N1, and the potential impact that the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant failure could have on West Coast communities in the United States. 
Multiple layers of government had difficulty rallying around a common message and 
strategy.76 The normal processes for managing disasters will be insufficient in response 
to “wicked” problems that offer limited time for analysis and reaction.77 The framework 
established for routine emergencies provides a good foundation, but the requirements 
                                                 
75 Bolton and Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex 
Adaptive System,” 2.  
76 Barb Graff, phone interview with the author, Friday, September 28, 2012.  
77 Bolton and Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex 
Adaptive System,” 2. 
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necessary to combat emergencies of catastrophic proportions demands more. Some of the 
elements that will be required of emergency managers in the face of a catastrophic event 
include the profound need to adapt and expand capacity quickly, restore communication 
systems, embrace flexible decision making, and a general dramatic increase in the level 
of coordination.78 
(2) Develop and Follow Mutually Agreed Upon Priorities. 
During major disasters, the state is responsible for setting the objectives. The success of 
disaster response is related to the initial planning process (Incident Action Planning) and 
the agreement on objectives and priorities. Inefficient disaster response generally results 
from confusion about the objectives or limited agreement about priorities.  
(3) Improve State and Local Capacity. Successful disaster 
response requires both precise catastrophic planning and bottom-up capacity building.79 
Limited state and local capacity leads to the over federalization of disaster response. The 
concept that disasters should be managed at the lowest possible level is lost without 
sufficient resources to affect change and mitigate consequences. Some of the over-
escalation is attributed to media; what some researchers refer to as the CNN Syndrome 
(all disasters quickly become incidents of national significance).80 The second major 
contributor to the rapid intervention of federal support is the expectation that this 
assistance will arrive quickly following a disaster. An abandonment of the three-tiered 
approach to disaster response (local-state-federal) in attempt to mobilize resources 
quickly does occur. Failing to enhance local capacity creates a quandary that perpetuates 
the continued federalization of smaller-scale disasters and fuels frustration about the 
federal response to disasters.  
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The second dilemma that exists results from the pursuit of all-
hazards preparedness while homeland security grant funding remains focused on 
terrorism-related prevention, response, and recovery. Recent funding decisions illustrate 
that all-hazards preparedness takes a backseat to terrorism.81 Limited and reducing means 
have inhibited state and local capacity building. Focusing on capacity building, rather 
than type of incident, will enable states and locals to develop robust tools for disaster 
response regardless of the origin of the emergency.  
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions pertaining to roles 
and responsibilities and command and control. 
 Who is in charge during Presidentially Declared Disasters? What are they 
in charge of? What activities are they responsible for? 
 What should be the primary activities or functions of FEMA Headquarters 
in disaster response? Are these activities and functions appropriate? 
 Would greater or lesser FEMA Headquarter involvement improve 
disaster response? 
 What should be the primary activities or functions of FEMA Regional 
Offices in disaster response? Are these activities and functions 
appropriate? 
 Would greater or lesser FEMA Regional Office involvement 
improve disaster response? 
 Is there sufficient interaction between Regional Offices and local 
emergency management agencies during disasters? 
 What should be the primary activities or functions of Federal Coordinating 
Officers (FCO) in disaster response? Are these activities and functions 
appropriate? 
 Would greater or lesser FEMA FCO involvement improve disaster 
response? 
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 Is there sufficient interaction between FEMA FCOs and local 
government leaders during disasters? 
 What should be the primary activities or functions of local emergency 
management agencies in disaster response? Are these activities or 
functions appropriate? 
 Would greater or lesser local level involvement improve disaster 
response? 





Roles and Responsibilities 




- Maintaining perspective and 
balance during both times of 
disasters and during peacetime. 
- Ensure the federal government is 
acting like one agency. 
- Ensure that resources are brought 
to bear with minimal duplication 
of effort and redundancy. 
- Overall federal support and 
coordination (largely through 
NRCC). 
- Support to Regional Offices. 
- Policy guidance. 
- Unity of efforts. 
- “Rule and tools.” 
- Policy development and 
strategic direction. 
- Focus on the larger mission and 
vision. 
- Consistency of service across 
regions.  
- Movement of resources to 
empower Regional 
Administrators. 
- “Rules and tools.” 
- Set conditions for success and 
feed resources to those who 
need to execute.  
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Roles and Responsibilities 




- Support the empowerment of 
Regional Offices. 
- Regional Offices are the “face of 
FEMA.” 
- Regional Offices are well 
positioned to have a better 
understanding of needs and 
resource gaps due to their 
relationships with states and 
locals.  
- Serve as a feedback loop for 
FEMA Headquarters.  
- Regional Offices serve as 
liaisons, but could provide greater 
serve to large cities and densely 
populated areas.  
- Need for improved coordination.  
- The deployment of regional 
employees to other regions 
lessens the likelihood that there 
will be familiarity among 
responders.  
- The perception is that regions 
continue to operate under status 
quo during disasters and should 
be more mission focused. 
- There is far greater latitude and 
authority delegated to the 
Regions under the current 
Administration.  
- Regions are empowered and are 
able to be much more involved in 
disaster response. 
- Regions can assist with 
expeditious, forward deployment 
and have locally managed caches 
of supplies and resources.  
- Regions provide a critical 
linkage between states and 
territories and centralized 
federal government. 
- Regions provide support to 
FCOs by working closely with 
states and locals, particularly 
with elected leadership within 
impacted jurisdictions.  
- Regions are the “implementers” 
of Headquarters’ “rules and 
tools.”  
- Vitally important in ensuring 
consistency in policies not only 
within a particular region, but 
across regions as well.  
- Regions provide perspective on 
policy and can advise on the 
utility and applicability.  
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Roles and Responsibilities 





- Position is designed to gauge the 
capability of the community and 
evaluate the level of support.  
- FCOs need to be more cognizant 
of big city issues and need to be 
able to adapt to said nuances.  
- FCOs should not always think of 
disaster management in terms of 
three layers of government.  
- Important balance between 
servant leadership (being part of 
the team) versus command and 
control.  
- FCO serves as a liaison between 
Regional Administrator, 
Governor, and State Director. 
- Lead for intergovernmental 
coordination and responsible for 
meeting with local legislators and 
officials.  
- Responsible for educating 
community leaders on available 
resources, expectations, grant 
application and reimbursement 
process. 
- Ensure disaster survivors are 
receiving the services they are 
entitled to.  
- Face of FEMA during disasters.  
- Represent FEMA assistance 
programs and coordinating 
those programs across all levels 
of government.  
- Support the Incident Action 
Planning process and assist in 
the development of mutually 
agreed upon goals and 
operational objectives. 
- Responsible for the allocation 
and management resources.  
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Roles and Responsibilities 
 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 




- The capacity at the local level is 
diminishing, particularly in 
challenging economic times.  
- Locals have a responsibility, as 
well and can support FEMA.  
- There can be greater inclusion of 
local leaders in the planning 
process and in the development 
and sustainment of region 
capabilities.  
- FEMA’s primary customer is the 
state, but larger jurisdictions 
should be more involved due to 
the complexity of urban areas 
and an opportunity to operate 
more efficiently.  
- Local jurisdictions need to serve 
as a hub for information sharing. 
They are directly responsible for 
the gathering information that 
supports the declaration process.  
- Locals could assist with 
streamlining operations by 
knowing tactical and operational 
detail such as burn rate of 
commodities and types of 
generators needed. 
- Responsible for sharing ideas 
across jurisdictions.  
- Cannot be viewed as an island, 
but as an integral member of the 
team.  
- Strong and informed leadership, 
leadership that understands the 
process, greatly supports the 
overall system. The ability of 
local emergency management 
to educate the local government 
structure is vital.  
- There are statutory 
responsibilities with the states, 
but nuances with major 
metropolitan areas that need to 
be considered.  
- A good practice is the 
assignment of division 
supervisors to work directly 
with big cities.  
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Roles and Responsibilities 
 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Who is in 
charge? 
- Locals are in charge (City 
Manager, Mayor). 
- Locals are responsible for the 
tactical operations of an 
emergency. State and federal 
resources are assistive, but the 
local level will continue to “own” 
the problem and solution. 
- Governor is in charge and FEMA 
is responsible for supporting the 
Governor.  
- FEMA is a support entity. 
Support is channeled through the 
FCO who is responsible for 
coordination Joint Field Office 
operations.  
- Governor is in charge, but FCO 
leads operational activities. 
- People remain in charge of 
what they were always in 
charge of.  
- FEMA is never in charge, but 
that is a common 
misconception.  
- During Hurricane Katrina for 
example, there was a significant 
abdication of responsible.  




In contrast to the affinity that quality intergovernmental collaboration is 
both occurring and necessary, much greater variation occurs in the interpretation of roles 
and responsibilities and rather significant disparity exists in identifying lead agencies 
during disasters. General consensus occurred regarding roles and responsibilities; all 
responses either directly or loosely capture the essence of the division and labor among 
local emergency management agencies, FEMA regional offices, and FEMA headquarters. 
Particularly at the local level, and partially at the regional level, respondents recognized 
the need to be adaptive to the unique needs of major metropolitan areas. However, the 
interviews showed that some reluctance to depart significantly from protocol and policy 
still existed.  
An interesting division occurred between local and federal respondents in 
which local agencies largely believed that they remained in charge, where federal 
agencies gave responses aligned with response doctrine and the authority granted to states 
in the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the local agencies appear to be embracing their role 
in the three-tiered response model and do not want to abdicate responsibility.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Improve Understanding of Roles and Responsibilities. One 
of the most interesting results from the data collection was the variation in response 
pertaining to roles and responsibilities. While the responses were similar in nature, 
multiple variations appeared concerning the functions of local emergency management 
agencies, FEMA regional offices, and FEMA headquarters. Discerning who is in charge 
during presidentially declared emergencies resulted in a near even split between local and 
federal (regional offices and headquarters) entities. Local agencies believed that they 
remained in command during presidentially declared disasters, while FEMA was 
consistently clear that the governors are in charge. A consistent understanding of roles 




(2) Identify Opportunities for Flexible and Adaptive 
Management. The traditional model for disaster response relies on a linear approach to 
problem solving. The tiered response model is exemplary of the linear structure. Disasters 
(unfamiliar incidents in particular) may require flexibility and a divergence from a 
traditional model. During complex events, leaders will need to set aside venerated 
hierarchical and jurisdictional boundaries and consider horizontal relationships and 
networks.82 An example of a nonlinear approach would be a direct partnership between 
federal and local entities, as warranted by the incident. The coordination that occurred in 
lower Manhattan between New York City and FEMA was an effective nonlinear model 
and streamlined decision making. A shift towards a nonlinear approach will allow for 
nuances of major metropolitan areas to be addressed appropriately during a response. 
Such nuances include the likelihood of densely populated areas and sophistication of 
established systems that could compliment and strength the provision of disaster 
assistance.  
3. Effectiveness of Resource Deployment 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions pertaining to 
resource deployment. 
 Does the response to Presidentially Declared Disasters, specifically the 
deployment of federal entities such as federal employees and disaster 
reservists, meet the needs of the affected communities? 
 If you identified that they system does not work as optimally as it 
should, why is this? Can you provide specific examples? 
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Effectiveness of Resource Deployment 




- It helps, but local agencies do not 
rely on federal support.  
- Local EMAs assume that the 
earliest deployment of resources 
is 72 hours post-incident, so 
there is local preparation 
occurring.  
- Perhaps the deployment of 
federal resources is too soon 
resulting in a depletion of 
resources and an inability to 
manage multiple incidents.  
- Deployment of Incident 
Management Teams (IMT) and 
FCOs is helpful. 
- Federal support over the past few 
years as degraded slightly. 
Greater emphasis is needed on 
federal assistance in a supportive 
capacity, not lead/command 
capacity.  
- Frequent turnover is challenging. 
 
- Deployment of resources does 
help, but states and locals need 
to know what is needed and 
there needs to be a plan for 
utilizing these resources.  
- FEMA can mobilize and deliver 
resources fairly quickly and 
how states and locals manage 
these resources is an important 
component of the process. 
- FEMA is always welcome 
because they bring resources 
and support, but it is only one 
option. 
- Federal support works well in 
response, but greater emphasis 
on leveraging non-federal 
assistance could improve in 
making families and 
communities whole.  
- There should be greater focus 
on planning for non-Stafford 
Act disasters (those with limited 
federal assistance).  
- Federal assistance is helpful and 
in general, the system does work.  
- The mere presence of federal 
resources, even initial 
deployments, gives the 
perception and reassurance that 
there is understanding of the 
magnitude of the severity of the 
disaster.  
- FEMA is in the process of 
expanding the Disaster Reservist 
cadre which will lessen the 
number of times individuals are 
deployed. To account for this, 
FEMA is budgeting for 
additional training days and 
more opportunity to spend time 
in the Regional Offices.  
 




The deployment of federal entities to disaster scenes is an amalgamation 
of government agencies. Despite the complexities that might accompany this 
convergence, responses about the deployment of federal entities were fairly benign, even 
apathetic. All respondents found federal assistance to be helpful, but consistent 
acknowledgment occurred that this assistance was only one option among many and by 
no means a silver bullet. Local agencies stated that they do not rely on federal assistance 
and are preparing so they can be sufficient for the initial 72 hours. Greater emphasis 
needs to be placed on capitalizing on non-federal resources during disasters, and 
particularly focusing on major incidents that do not trigger a Stafford Act declaration.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Open Dialogue About Anticipated Unmet Needs. As 
identified during the interview process, local agencies play an important role in analyzing 
and managing the use of commodities. The infamous exchange between state and local 
leaders following Hurricane Andrew (the state Emergency Operations Center was asking 
for specific unmet needs to which the local Emergency Management Agency replied with 
“send everything!”) anecdotally paints the picture about challenges with not knowing 
what is needed within locally impacted jurisdictions.83 Resource management is a key 
component of disaster response and plans need to identify necessary supplies. Addressing 
the need for surge capacity requires careful advance assessment of potential needs, 
allocation of sufficient budgetary resources, detailed logistical planning, and skillful 
improvisation.84 
Following Hurricane Katrina, states initiated conversations with 
FEMA about anticipated unmet needs. South Carolina, for example, admitted to needing 
                                                 
83 Wamsley and Schroeder, “Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of the Emergency 
Management Policy Subsystem,” 237. 
84 Arnold M. Howitt and Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, “Katrina and the Core Challenges of Disaster 
Response,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 218.  
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outside assistance and detailed the specific functions for which they would need help.85 
The tiered response model is designed for the effective deployment and management of 
resources, and local agencies (and states) have a responsibility to ensure that requests for 
assistance are strategic and can be appropriately integrated into response operations. 
Furthermore, due to the diversity of communities within a single FEMA region, it is 
unrealistic for FEMA to know the intricacies (commodity burn rate, staging areas, and 
tactical deployment strategies) of the local communities.  
(2) Evaluate Workforce Composition and Development. The 
findings from the research demonstrate improved interface between federal employees 
and local emergency management agencies could occur. Respondents enjoyed the 
relationships that had developed, but noted that individuals they were accustomed to 
working with were often deployed out of their regions, and thus, reduced the likelihood 
that they would be working with people with which they had developed relationships. 
This recommendation focuses on improving the size of the regional offices as a way to 
develop more robust relationships between local and federal agencies.  
As of March 2012, FEMA reported that it had a workforce of over 
18,000 employees, of which approximately 26% (just shy of 4,800) are permanent. The 
remaining 74% are comprised of other employees, including disaster reservists. From 
fiscal years 2005 through March 2012, FEMA’s permanent workforce has increased by 
approximately 128% (from 2,100 to 4,792) and its disaster-related temporary employees 
have increased by approximately 146% (from 5,458 to 13,418 employees).86 
Approximately 70% of FEMA’s permanent workforce is located at its headquarters and 
the remaining 30% are assigned to FEMA’s 10 regional offices. FEMA disaster response 
employees also work at temporary disaster response/recovery sites established across the 
country.87  
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Based on these statistics about the composition of FEMA’s 
workforce, it is recommended that FEMA continue to expand its full-time permanent 
workforce and continue to increase the number of employees detailed to regional offices. 
This augmentation would have a two-fold result, the development of an opportunity for 
expanded partnerships that could be leveraged during disaster response, and secondly, by 
increasing the capacities of the regions, greater opportunity for federal employees to be 
involved with planning and capacity building at the state and local level would occur. 
(3) Greater Focus on Non-Stafford Act Declarations. The 
Stafford Act of 1988 gives the federal government the authority to respond to disasters 
and emergencies to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and 
property.88 Both local and regional respondents raised the issue of responding to disasters 
in the absence of a Stafford Act declaration with the acknowledgment that federal 
assistance will not always be available and continued opportunities and a need to 
leverage partnerships during these circumstances existed.  
4. Understanding Affected Communities 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions pertaining to 
transfer of knowledge and understanding of impacted communities. 
 Do federal agencies know what they need to about local communities? For 
example, did FEMA know the characteristics of New Orleans in order to 
appropriately respond to the needs of the community? Why or why not? 
 Is there an opportunity to use the knowledge and familiarity of 
local agencies to improve situational awareness and improve 
community and cultural competency? 
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Understanding Affected Communities 




- While this would help, it is 
unreasonable to expect the 
federal government to fully 
understand the nuances of 
local jurisdictions. The 
country is too expansive and 
diverse for this.  
- There are initiatives in place 
that could provide platforms 
for improved information 
sharing (Ex. Threat and 
Hazard, Identification and 
Risk Assessment (THIRA), 
FEMA fellowships and 
exchange programs).  
- Interface with FEMA is often 
compliance-based which 
minimizes the quality and 
utility of the effort.  
 
- There are areas for better pre-event 
integration.  
- Education could further support 
locals in crafting the story. Disaster 
declarations are about telling a 
comprehensive story—beyond the 
preliminary damage assessment. 
This information could help FEMA 
better understand the magnitude of 
the situation.  
- An understanding of local 
government systems and processes 
could serve as force multipliers for 
federal assistance. For example, 
cities with robust social service 
infrastructure in place could expand 
the provision of individual assistance 
efforts. Similarly, robust financial 
systems could streamline and add 
sophistication to the Public 
Assistance (project worksheet) 
declaration process.  
- While the primary interface is 
between federal and state 
entities, there may be need to 
flexibility. For example, when 
federal employees deploy, they 
have difficulty understanding 
what an area looked like pre-
disaster.  
- Information and data about 
local communities could 
quickly become outdated so it 
is unreasonable and 
burdensome to for FEMA to 
maintain this. Locals could 
serve more of an interface for 
real-time information.  
- Statutory and mission 
requirements that create 
limitations on the federal-local 
interface.  
 




Evidence from previous disasters indicates that gaps in knowledge about 
local communities have been a hindrance to effective disaster response. While this 
research focuses on response, local agencies responded to this question more 
comprehensively and cited examples in planning and preparedness to highlight the 
limitations of federal-local integration. While expressed criticism was stated, a desire 
existed to find utility in federal planning and compliance measures and use these 
processes to expand partnerships and develop multi-governmental strategies, particular 
regarding threat and hazard analysis.  
Agreement was acknowledged that interfaces could be improved to 
capture the needs and nuances of local communities better. Regional responders, in 
particular, felt that understanding local communities could serve as a mechanism for 
extending service provision by finding alignments with social infrastructure or 
streamlining operations based on the sophistication and finesse of local government 
systems.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Focus on Utility and Quality, Over Compliance-Based 
Initiatives. Feedback provided by local agencies expressed concern about the extent of 
local participation in planning initiatives and the increasing emphasis on compliance-
based planning, which is a departure from a quality workflow and final product. A recent 
example is the Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) program, which is 
required for grant purposes. Local agencies support the concept and recognize that this 
program could be a useful planning tool for appropriately identifying risk at the local, 
state, and regional level. However, the need for the THIRA to be completed within a 
short timeframe diminishes the quality and inclusiveness of the process and the 
applicability of the final product.  
(2) Improve Declaration Process Through Expanded Training. 
Disaster declarations are largely based on quantitative assessments about the extent of 
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damage. The accompaniment of qualitative data to further support the declaration process 
is often excluded. The qualitative narrative not only contributes to determining if a 
declaration is warranted, it describes the landscape pre-disaster that helps responders 
prioritize recovery efforts. Expanded training will help local governments develop a 
comprehensive story about the impact of a particular disaster.  
5. Transition from Response to Recovery 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions pertaining to the 
transition from response to recovery. 
 How well does the transition from response to recovery work? 
Specifically, does the transition of command from the federal to local level 




Transition from Response to Recovery 
 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Transition 
to Recovery 
- Transition from 
response to recovery is 
evolving and largely 
dependent on the impact 
community and 
resources and capacity 
available within that 
community. 
- Federal assistance is 
general last in and first 
out and the transition to 
recovery is sometimes 
hurried.  
- The transition is sometimes 
indistinguishable and the two 
operations blend together.  
- It is sometimes less about transition 
from response to recovery, but 
more a transition from robust 
federal involvement to much 
smaller federal involvement. 
- The length of time that FEMA 
supports recovery is a difficult 
policy question because recovery 
could last for years. The recovery in 
the Gulf Coast is still ongoing.  
- The development of the National 
Disaster Recovery Framework 
(NDRF), accompanied by the 
creation of Federal Disaster 
Recovery Coordinators (FDRC), 
provides guidance and places 
greater emphasis on effect recovery. 
- The establishment of recovery task 
forces has proven to be supportive 
of communities and ease the 
transfer of coordination.  
- Transition poses difficulty with 
balancing maintaining a presence while 
being prepared for future disasters.  
- The extent of transition and length of 
support is dependent on the type of 
disaster (Ex. floods generally require 
longer recovery operations), area 
impacted, professionalism and capacity 
of the states.  
- FEMA has learned difficult lessons from 
pulling out of an area too quickly and 
then needing to either re-deploy or try to 
provide support from afar. When the 
majority of federal resources vacate an 
area, outstanding issues are directed 
back to the Regional Offices. Premature 
departures can overwhelm regional 
operations.  
- Recovery should focus on long term 
efforts and help a community envision 
what a community will look like in the 
future (ten years later for example). It 
can provide an opportunity for 
communities to be inventive and 
transformative surrounding systemic 
issues such as low income housing.  




No set rules or benchmarks outlined when the transition from response to 
recovery (specifically, the departure of federal resources) should occur, which is an 
amorphous process dependent on the status of the impacted community and availability 
of local resources that can fill in voids left by the reduction in federal support. In addition 
to managing the expectations surrounding a particular community, a larger balancing act 
of being prepared for future disasters with limited resources exists.  
Local agencies did not necessarily feel that FEMA’s departure was 
untimely, but did feel that the transition was sometime hurried, which left little time for 
succession planning. A significant take-away from this section was the need to open 
dialogue about the status of recovery operations and early discussions about appropriate 
times to scale down federal support. The newly created position of Federal Disaster 
Recovery Coordinators (FDRC) should lessen the difficulties with this transition.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Develop a Mutually Agreed Upon Exit Strategy. The adage 
in emergency management is that disasters begin and end at the local level meaning that 
federal support is a temporary assistance. The decision regarding the cessation of the 
majority of federal resources is not an exact science, but conceptually occurs when the 
majority of people impacted have received initial assistance. The transition from response 
to recovery can be problematic of local jurisdictions. Local agencies—generally much 
smaller organizations than federal counterparts—simply do not have the depth of 
personnel to segment response operations from recovery operations. Early conversations 
about transfer of command and the development of an exit strategy can help local 
agencies prepare for the departure of federal partners.  
(2) Improve Coordination with Local Community During 
Recovery. FEMA’s Whole Community philosophy is working to establish partnerships 
for improved preparedness, but should be extended to focus on response and recovery as 
well. During a recent interview, William Carwile, Associate Administrator, Response and 
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Recovery, referenced a pilot debris management program underway in Louisiana.89 
Private nonprofits are leading debris management efforts, with material and resource 
support provided by FEMA and United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
providing training and quality control, which is an example of ways to include the local 
fabric within a community. Following Hurricane Katrina, researchers focusing on 
individual and community engagement following the disaster highlighted that 
bureaucratic challenges created roadblocks in the delivery of disaster assistance, and in 
particular for demolition and construction services.90 The Louisiana pilot project provides 
opportunities for community engagement, while providing government support and 
minimizes delays. 
6. Best Practices and Areas of Opportunity 
a. Interview Questions 
Interview subjects were asked the following questions identifying best 
practices and areas for further research. 
 Which disasters do you often refer to as best practices? Which disasters do 
you think demonstrate challenges, areas needs improving, or failures? 
 What three items would improve the disaster response system? 
                                                 
89 William Carwile, interview with the author, FEMA Headquarters, Washington, DC, September 7, 
2012. 
90 John J. Green et al., “The Texture of Local Disaster Response: Service Providers’ Views Following 




Best Practices and Areas of Opportunity 
 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Best Practices 
- Best practices 
identifiable in local 
disasters.  
- Deep Water Horizon 
was a good case study 
in leadership and 
collaboration among 
leadership. 






- Earthquake, tsunami, 
and nuclear power plant 
accident in Japan 
highlighted the 
likelihood and 
challenges of cascading 
incidents.  
- The response to the 
Midwestern floods in Illinois 
in 2008 was effective due to 
the use of historic flood data 
and early engagement with 
media outlets.  
- All disasters have levels of 
failure and there are lessons 
that can be learned from 
every opportunity.  
- It is important to study if 
cornerstone principles are in 
place such as coordination 
and communication.  
- The World Trade Center response in New 
York was a good case study because of 
the various governments and 
establishment of disparate command and 
coordination entities.  
- Hurricane Katrina is a historic case. It is 
interesting to observe how quickly 
agencies needed to identify who was to 
blame, rather than working towards 
common solutions.  
- The 2004 hurricane season and the 
impact to Florida taught FEMA things 
about post-disaster housing programs.  
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Best Practices and Areas of Opportunity 
 Local Perspective Regional Perspective Federal Perspective 
Recommendations 
- Greater focus on 
regional training and 
development of mutual 
aid partnerships. 
- Continued focus on 
private sector in 
recognition of the 
importance of getting 
people back to work 
and school. 




- Focus on process and 
refine processes as 
needed, but refrain 
from major overhauls. 
- Improve continuity 
among federal 
responders.  
- Plan and exercise 
together.  
- Develop realistic 
management techniques 
for catastrophic events.  
- Need to develop a 
comprehensive education 
strategy on the disaster 
response process. 
- Develop recovery solutions 
for disasters outside the 
spectrum of presidential 
disaster declarations. 
- Develop more efficient 
Public Assistance strategies, 
particularly for jurisdictions 
that have sophisticated 
financial systems.  
- Disaster housing is labor 
intensive and not as 
supportive as it could be. The 
process is antiquated.  
- Focus on establishing clear understanding 
of role and responsibilities.  
- Focus on the development of an exit 
strategy that ensures all entities are aware 
of the process and the transitions.  
- Align mission activities with core 
capabilities of federal agencies (Ex. 
Housing and Urban Development should 
provide greater subject matter expertise 
on housing programs). FEMA has taken 
on leadership and coordination roles in 
areas when there are natural leaders 
positioned within other agencies. 
- Revisit statutory responsibilities of 
federal agencies to optimize federal 
efforts. 
- Continue to embrace and refine the ‘one 
team’ mentality.  
- Focus on community resiliency. Able 
bodied individuals should focus on self-
sufficiency which would prioritize 
resources to needed individuals and 
communities.  
- Ensure the optimization of the Joint Field 
Office concept so that it consists of the 
right processes, resources, equipment, 
and personnel. 
Table 6.   Data Collection—Best Practices and Areas for Opportunity 
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c. Analysis 
The final question of the research survey focused based practices and 
areas for opportunity. Collecting best practices was intended to support the collection of 
secondary data, but also to demonstrate the diversity in types of responses. Interestingly 
enough, few respondents referred to disasters as best practices, but rather spoke about the 
teachable moments and complexity of the various operations, as if to acknowledge that 
nothing about a disaster can be labeled as ‘best.’ MaryAnn E. Tierney, Regional 
Administrator for Region III, said that in many ways all disasters reveal system failures; 
it is the degree of failure that changes.91  
When asked about areas for opportunity, respondents focused both on 
recommendations related to prior questions during the interview or took advantage of the 
opportunity to provide new and innovative opportunities. Suggestions focused on 
expansion and prioritization of regional efforts, such as training and mutual aid 
relationships, the need to improve community resiliency as a first layer of disaster 
response, and continued refinement of roles and responsibilities. The novel and particular 
ideas—those not necessarily directly related to the research—are suggested areas for 
future research.  
d. Recommendations 
(1) Continue to Use Planned Events to Develop and Refine 
Collaborative Processes. While the frequency of disasters is increasing overall, disasters 
are still uncommon and as a result, insufficient opportunities exist to test disaster 
response procedures thoroughly. To facilitate timely response, prearranged decision 
protocols need to be repeatedly rehearsed by people who will be involved in the actual 
emergency.92 Planned events provide additional opportunities for developing and refining 
protocols. Two contrasting examples that support this idea are the differences between 
the response in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina and the Pentagon following 
                                                 
91 MaryAnn E. Tierney, interview with the author, FEMA Region III Offices, Philadelphia, PA, 
Wednesday, August 1, 2012. 
92 Kapucu, “Examining the National Response Plan in Response to a Catastrophic Disaster: Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005,” 288–289.  
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9/11. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin complained about the lack of collaboration and 
coordination with federal agencies, but the Pentagon had gone to great lengths to 
determine who would be in charge during an incident and worked closely with the local 
municipality (Arlington, Virginia) in formulating plans.93 When faced with complex 
problems, officials who have not planned together are challenged by who does what.94 
(2) Continue to Focus on Private Sector Integration. One of the 
most consistent findings from the data collection was the value of private sector 
integration. The availability of the private sector can minimize the likelihood of 
cascading effects. Expeditious recovery is largely based on how quickly supply chains 
are restored and private sector is fully operational. Interviewees regarded FEMA’s 
inclusion of private sector within the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) as 
an important development and representative of larger collaborative aspirations. FEMA 
believes so strongly in the aid of private sector integration, it has coined the “Waffle 
House index,” which serves as a damage assessment tool.95 Waffle House has embraced 
a disaster-resistant model and strives to keep stores operational, even during major 
disasters. A closed Waffle House during a disaster is one indicator that FEMA needs to 
prioritize that particular area. While FEMA’s Waffle House index has been modestly 
satirized, Waffle House’s commitment to disaster resiliency proves that the private sector 
is able to support disaster recovery and understands its roles within a larger context of 
community restoration.  
C. FEASIBILITY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Central themes emerged through the collection and analysis of primary and 
secondary data. These themes include the systemic lack of community resiliency, an 
inability to manage expectations due to a limited comprehensive understanding of the  
 
                                                 
93 Bolton and Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex 
Adaptive System,” 10. 
94 Ibid., 9. 
95 The Huffington Post, “The ‘Waffle House Index’: FEMA Impressed By Chain’s Disaster 
Preparedness,” September 1, 2011, Updated November 1, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/01/waffle-house-hurricanes_n_945756.html. 
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disaster response process and the role of the media in framing disasters, and lastly, the 
need to recruit, develop, and nurture partnerships with non-traditional stakeholders 
continually, such as those in the private sector.  
The aforementioned recommendations focus on improving these central themes 
through the lenses of intergovernmental collaboration, understanding roles and 
responsibilities, effectiveness of resource mobilization, incorporation of local knowledge, 
transition from response to recovery, and the sustainment of best practices. The 
recommendations are weighted derived from a nominal scoring system (High=Highly 
Likely/Positively Perceived, Medium=Somewhat Likely/Neutrally Perceived, 
Low=Unlikely/Negatively Perceived) based on the likelihood of implementation founded 
on five categories of limitations: political acceptability, economic plausibility, public 
perception, effectiveness, and utilization of resources. The discussion portion of this 
thesis concludes with a list for further research ideas generated from subject matter 
experts and recurring concepts identified within the literature.  
Several of the recommendations require minimal political or economic support to 
be implemented. Recommendations of this nature generally require sustainment or 
modest expansion of current initiatives. However, other recommendations will be more 
challenging to implement due to political acceptability, economic plausibility, public 
perception, presumed effectiveness, and utilization of resources. Table 7 summarizes the 
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Table 7.   Scoring of Recommendations Based on Multifactorial Acceptability 
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1. Political Acceptability 
Political acceptability is defined as the likelihood that elected officials or those in 
political positions would embrace a particular recommendation, could also be interpreted 
as likelihood that policy would be adopted.  
2. Economic Plausibility 
Economic plausibility refers to the possibility of a recommendation being 
implemented from a financial perspective. High scores mean that a particular 
recommendation would not require significant economic investments.  
3. Public Perception 
Public perception refers to the likelihood that members of the public would 
welcome a recommendation. Public acceptance of a recommendation would be likely if 
the public could identify the benefits, it is lower cost, would lead to greater safety, or 
improved outcomes. 
4. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is the predicted impacted that a particular recommendation would 
result in improve disaster response.  
5. Utilization of Resources 
Utilization of resources relates to the effective and appropriate use of resources. 
Higher scores in this category mean that a particular recommendation would enable 
responders to use resources more appropriately during a disaster response.  
D. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A series of recommendations were put forth as part of this research. While some 
of the recommendations are less feasible, several would require minimal political or 
economic support and would be well-received by the public. Six recommendations that 
should be emphasized not only improve the current tiered disaster response model, but  
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they also provide opportunities for continuing the migration to a more decentralized, 
collaborative approach. These recommendations are based on primary data analysis and 
supported by the literature.  
1. Develop mutually agreed up priorities 
2. Improve consistent understanding of roles and responsibilities 
3. Explore opportunities for flexible and adaptive management 
4. Improve coordination with local community during recovery 
5. Continue to use planned events as training opportunities 
6. Continue to focus on private sector integration 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The final question of the primary data collection asked subject matter experts to 
identify three ideas for future research. Ideas range from a desire to place greater 
emphasis on issues already in place to new and innovative ideas for improving the 
response and recovery to disasters.  
1. Improve diversity within the emergency management workforce 
2. Reconsider interim and long-term disaster housing options. The current 
disaster-housing program moves individuals in and out of several types of 
housing, which is disruptive, and delays recovery. The movement of 
people can increase stress for disaster survivors and for people living in 
the areas to which they relocate.96 Identifying opportunities for 
streamlining this situation could be much more transformative and 
effective.  
3. Invest greater resources into hazard mitigation at the state and federal 
levels in recognition of the limited capacity at the local level. The 
development of the built environment has created a quagmire in that it 
degrades the natural barriers that protect communities.97  
4. Develop a system for measuring success of Joint Field Office operations, 
particularly focusing on the utility and organizational integration 
5. Revisit statutory authorities and develop policy options for increasing the 
role of local government during single jurisdiction incidents. In other 
words, incidents will occur that impact only one geopolitical area within a 
state, but still rise to the level of a presidential disaster declaration. 
Statutory authorities should be augmented to allow for direct coordination 
between local and federal entities.  
6. Explore differences in resiliency and response capabilities between urban 
and rural communities.  
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explores the current disaster response model and evaluates whether an 
adaptive, nonlinear approach could be of value. In addition to this central theme of 
                                                 
96 Green et al., “The Texture of Local Disaster Response: Service Providers’ Views Following 
Hurricane Katrina,” 30.  
97 Wamsley and Schroeder, “Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of the Emergency 
Management Policy Subsystem,” 238. 
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organizational design, this thesis explores roles and responsibilities, evaluates what about 
the current tiered model works well, and discusses the pros and cons of disaster response 
strategies by looking specifically at interagency collaboration. As demonstrated in this 
thesis, disasters are wicked problems. They are a nucleus for complexity and 
complication and lack an absolute answer, but are rather, a pursuit for the best solution. 
In addition to being the meeting point for numerous organizations and associated 
bureaucracy, disasters are defining moments in history. Much can be learned about a 
community, city, or nation by the way it behaves in a moment of crisis.  
As described earlier, a range of confounding variables influence the management 
of emergencies. It is not surprising that a system pervaded by the volume and magnitude 
of auxiliary components is at times ineffective. In addition to the enormity of the 
variables, the dichotomy between war and peacetime—response versus steady state—is 
challenging. Organizations responsible for responding to emergencies must operate in a 
continual state of readiness and invest considerable time and energy towards convincing 
others that it is important to be prepared for something that may occur (unknown when, 
where, and how).  
The pairing of primary and secondary data provided an opportunity to review 
perceptions included within academic literature, what is believed by practitioners, and 
what actually occurs. The incorporation of subject matter expertise brings interesting 
perspectives and a level of reality. It is interesting to see where the academic and 
practitioner perspectives aligned and differed.  
Despite persistent criticism, the consensus among practitioners is that disaster 
response generally works well. Minor hiccups occur in processes. However,  experts in 
the field do not support the rampant criticism about the system, and the suggestion that 
the processes for responding to disasters continue to miss the mark. Local emergency 
management agencies find the current FEMA to be adaptive and flexible, and very 
willing to work collaboratively with state and local agencies. In a recent interview about 
FEMA’s response to Hurricane Sandy, Administrator Fugate said very simply, “better to 
be fast than to be late,” in response to questions about FEMA’s early deployment and 
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quick mobilization of resources.98 This response is indicative of the forward-leaning 
nature of an organization that has adapted to the challenges and criticism of previous 
emergencies.  
The second item of interest is that the process for responding to disasters is quite 
system like. When asked about various roles and responsibilities of government agencies, 
some participants noted that FEMA regional offices are a feedback loop for headquarters 
and provide connectivity between centralized headquarters and what occurs within local 
communities. Given the multitude of considerations associated with disaster response, it 
seems that a flexible and adaptive system is not only needed, but components of it 
already exist. Modern emergency management presents a paradox of both meticulous 
planning and organization, but simultaneously the need to innovate, adapt, and improvise 
to ensure that plans fit the circumstances.99 FEMA’s combination of central policy 
development and decentralized policy implementation embraces the competing and 
paradoxical principles of compacted and dispersed structures.  
The final theme in the research focused on local-level capacity building. 
Literature emphasizes the insular and provincial nature of disasters. Local agencies are 
the first to respond and will be working on an incident well after the dissolution of mutual 
aid, state, and federal resources. State and federal agencies provide support and 
assistance, but these efforts are not intended to supplant local capabilities. However, as 
budgets are reduced, local level capacity building is going to become more and more 
challenging. Continued and greater emphasis on local response capabilities is essential as 
the frequency and magnitude of disasters is increasing, as are the expectations for 
successful disaster management.  
Disasters are highly inopportune and represent a convergence of complexities, 
including multiple layers of government, private and non-profit organizations, and 
diverse populations. This research shows that ongoing efforts are occurring to improve an 
                                                 
98 Jennifer Steinhauer and Michael S. Schmidt, “Man Behind FEMA’s Makeover Built Philosophy on 
Preparation,” The New York Times, November 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/us/the-man-
behind-femas-post-katrina-makeover.html?pagewanted=all.  
99 Waugh and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 132. 
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already well-functioning system, a system that will thrive on collaboration and 
improvisation. Disasters and the fears of disaster generate a strong desire for hierarchy, 
somebody to take charge, or possibly, someone to be held accountable. Such thinking is 
inconsistent with the tenets of the field and displays blindness to what collaborative 
action has accomplished.100  
                                                 
100 Waugh and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 138. 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PRIMARY DATA 
COLLECTION 
 
Thesis title: Rethinking Disasters: Finding Efficiencies through Collaboration 
 
This survey seeks to examine the relationships and intergovernmental collaboration 
within the national disaster response system. For the purposes of this research, the 
national disaster response system is the multi-governmental response to presidentially 




Organization name: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Position title: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Length of time in current position (in years): ___________________________________ 
 
Number of years of service in disaster response/emergency management: ____________ 
 
Which, if any, presidentially declared disasters have you worked?  
 




1. Based on your professional experience, please describe the 
intergovernmental collaboration within the current disaster response 
structure. 
a. If you identified that collaboration does not work as optimally as it 
should, what is this attributable to? Can you provide specific 
examples demonstrating this? 
 
2. Does the response to presidentially declared disasters, specifically the 
deployment of federal entities, federal employees, and disaster assistance 
employees, meet the needs of the affected communities? 
a. If you identified that this system does not work as optimally as it 
should, why is this? Can you provide specific examples? 
 
3. Who is in charge during Presidentially Declared Disasters? What are they 
in charge of? What activities are they responsible for? 
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4. What should be the primary activities or functions of FEMA Headquarters 
in disaster response? Are these activities/functions are appropriate? 
a. Would greater or lesser FEMA HQ involvement improve disaster 
response? 
 
5. What should be the primary activities or functions of the FEMA Regional 
Offices in disaster response? Are these activities/functions are 
appropriate? 
a. Would greater or lesser FEMA Regional Office involvement 
improve disaster response? 
b. Is there sufficient interaction between FEMA Regional Offices and 
local emergency management agencies during disasters? 
 
6. What should be the primary activities or functions of Federal Coordinating 
Officers in disaster response? Are these activities/functions are 
appropriate? 
a. Would greater or lesser FEMA FCO involvement improve disaster 
response? 
b. Is there sufficient interaction between FEMA FCO and local 
government leaders during disasters? 
 
7. What should be the primary activities or functions of local emergency 
management agencies in disaster response? Are these activities/functions 
are appropriate? 
a. Would greater or lesser local-level involvement improve disaster 
response? 
b. Do local agencies have the capacity to fulfill current roles and 
responsibilities?  
 
8. Are the roles you described previously accurate of what actually occurs 
during disasters?  
 
9. Do federal agencies know what they need to about local communities? For 
example, did FEMA know the characteristics of New Orleans in order to 
appropriately respond to the needs of the community? Why or why not? 
a. Is there an opportunity to use the knowledge and familiarity of 




10. What is the ideal balance between federal and local agencies? Does this 
ideal balance currently exist? If not, what would you recommend to create 
the appropriate balance? 
 
11. Does the current disaster response model align with FEMA’s Whole of 
Community concept? Why or why not? 
 
12. Does the current model, specifically the involvement of FEMA, provide 
opportunities for community-based organizations and private non-profit 
integration? Why or why not? 
 
13. How well does the transition from response to recovery work? 
Specifically, does the transition of command from the federal to local level 
work reasonably well?  
 
14. Which disasters do you often refer to as best practices? Which disasters do 
you think demonstrate challenges, areas needing improvement, or failures? 
 
15. What three items that would improve the national disaster response 
system? This can include current things that should be enhanced or 
entirely new ideas. 
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